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Abstract 
Climate scientists and policy analysts alike have repeatedly called for urgent mitigating action to avoid 
the most adverse effects of climate change. However, within the political arena this action is largely 
lacking. In order to understand this discrepancy, we consider the institutions in climate change policy 
to be of central importance. Renewed interest in institutions has been generated to a great extent by 
‘new institutionalism’, a field of research combining economics, political science and sociology, and 
which has become increasingly popular since the 1980s. The tendency of institutions to resist change 
and thereby stabilising policy can be understood by using the concept of institutional inertia. Our 
review of the new institutionalist literature on climate change identifies five main mechanisms that 
generate institutional inertia: costs, uncertainty, path dependence, power and legitimacy. Means of 
addressing these mechanisms are proposed by referring to the work on institutional entrepreneurship 
and institutional work. A focus on the mechanisms that generate and regenerate institutional inertia 
is beneficial for future research on institutions and climate change, as it can be used to study 
bottlenecks for action and address more clearly the urgency of necessary policy interventions.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
There are currently strong pleas from the climate science and policy analysis communities to quickly 
adopt measures for the mitigation of anthropogenic climate change. Glaciologist Richard Allen states 
that “[i]f you want to be able to head off a few trillions of damages per year a few decades out, you 
need to start now” (Reference 1, p. 1230). Nevertheless, current climate change policy is significantly 
lagging behind the scientific evidence at hand. This discrepancy between science and policy can be 
considered one of the most pressing problems within climate change policy.2 This is intensified further 
by a parallel time lag in the climatic system. Because of long-term stock and flow relationships,3 many 
of the adverse impacts of climate change are delayed – concealed links between cause and effect in 
the climate system further lead to slow institutional responses to climate change. 
 
To address these institutional time lags, we review the ‘new institutionalist’ literature on climate 
change and examine the explanations for the slow movement of institutions. New institutionalism is 
a wide collection of research combining political science, sociology and economics and has grown in 
popularity from the 1980s onwards.4-7 By emphasising that social problems cannot be directly reduced 
to the level of the individual,4 new institutionalism can be seen as having emerged in reaction to a 
seemingly narrow focus on human agency and behaviour existing in the literature at the time.8 In the 
field of climate change and environmental policy, the new institutionalist approach has been widely 
applied to assess how both formal and informal institutions influence and shape the decisions made 
by organisations and policy-makers (e.g. Reference 9-11).  
 
In this review we focus on the concept of institutional inertia. Institutional inertia refers to the 
“‘stickiness’” (Reference 12, p. 8) of institutions, or to how they resist change. Arguably, this can be 
seen as a defining trait of institutions, as they embody stability and predictability to a considerable 
extent.13 We identify five main mechanisms of institutional inertia existing in the new institutionalist 
literature: (1) cost; (2) uncertainty; (3) path dependence; (4) power; and (5) legitimacy. Reviewing how 
the new institutionalist literature on climate change deals with the mechanisms generating and 
regenerating inertia is therefore highly relevant, particularly for making sense of the challenges of 
policy and governance to address climate change in a timely manner. This review article contributes 
to the discussion about the urgency of climate change policy by pinpointing bottlenecks for prompt 
policy action.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
In this review paper we treat institutional inertia as the inability of institutions to formulate timely 
responses to anthropogenic climate change. The key consequence of institutional inertia is that GHG 
emissions remain on the rise14 despite apparent efforts at cementing multilateral agreements to 
combat climate change.15 In addition, the climatic system is itself characterised by time lags, generated 
by the long lifetime of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. According to estimations, the lifetime 
of fossil fuel CO2 can be as long as “300 years, plus 25% that lasts forever” (Reference 16, p. 5). Another 
source of lag is the thermal inertia of ocean reservoirs. Even if all GHG emissions had ended in 2000, 
the heat of the ocean would have warmed the atmosphere by 0.6°C by the end of the century.1 The 
resilience of the climate problem is based on the fact that once enough GHGs have been emitted to 
cause serious climate change, it is difficult or even impossible to reverse the process.17 The result of 
the lag combined with resilience is that past emissions have already contributed to climatic change in 
the present, while present emissions are confronting future generations with additional change. 
 
If it is assumed that responsible governments tackle the most difficult of public policy problems, then 
inert climate change policy presents a compelling paradox.18, 19 Despite the scientific evidence, not 
much concerted policy activity is taking place. This motivates an explicit focus on the interfaces 
between inertia and the international political architecture (cf. Reference 20). Yet, while the absence 
of emission reduction targets-based outcomes in part follows the logic of a global commons tragedy, 
thus reinvigorating interest in the neo-realist approach to international relations (e.g. Reference 21), 
inertia is simultaneously mediated by several institutional factors that slow down or hinder 
progressive policy action.  
 
By viewing institutional inertia as the central organising principle around which the issue of inadequate 
climate policy revolves, a focus on the mechanisms which sustain inert institutional responses to 
climate change is put centre-stage. This requires diagnoses of the institutional characteristics of what 
works in devising appropriate policy responses,22 or conversely which institutions fail to confront these 
underlying mechanisms. Diagnostic research depends to a large extent on which institutional 
approach is used, particularly when such research is divided along analytical or prescriptive lines.23 To 
provide for diversity in this respect, the following section introduces new institutionalism as a 
framework for investigation. 
 
 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR INERTIA 
 
New institutionalism is often categorised into three separate strands: rational choice institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.24 These three strands embody different 
theoretical assumptions of what constitutes an institution and the relationship between institutions 
and behaviour. Therefore, the new institutionalist literature presents several explanations for what 
generates institutional inertia. Despite their differences, however, there have been attempts at cross-
fertilisation by combining insights from the three strands (e.g. Reference 25). Next, we briefly discuss 
these individual strands and describe their approaches to institutions.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) generally conceives institutions as rules, both formal and 
informal, which ensure the survival of a regime or an organisation. Institutions can essentially be seen 
as the rational outcome of what actors want them to do. The key motivation for institutional 
adherence is that institutions are expected to maximise individual gain by lowering transaction costs, 
thereby minimising collective action problems.26, 27 Similar to RCI, historical institutionalism (HI) 
envisages institutions as an assemblage of formal and informal rules and norms, but it does not regard 
them as existing independently from actors. In HI, it is instead suggested that the organisational 
makeup of the polity structures the incentives, attitudes and behaviours of actors, and that 
institutions are reproduced along circumscribed policy paths.12, 28 Sociological institutionalism (SI) 
depicts institutions as a collection of cultural artefacts: norms, values, routines, scripts and symbols.5, 
6 SI emphasises the socialising force of these institutions, which in turn determine the extent to which 
behaviour is legitimate or appropriate. Consequently, the choices and preferences of actors are closely 
tied to institutions. 
 
In particular RCI stands out amongst HI and SI because of its assumption that institutional inertia can 
be solved by the calculated attempt to satisfy private interests. This is in par with the literature on 
international relations, which distinguishes rationalist (RCI) from constructivist (HI and SI) approaches 
to understanding conflict and cooperation between states and multilateral power blocs.29 In HI and SI 
climate change is seen as a social construct, a view which is incommensurate with the ‘rational agenda’ 
of RCI. Constructivism presupposes that institutional inertia in international climate policy is a function 
of how climate change is represented in existing problem definitions and framings, not to mention the 
politicisation of uncertainty.30 Yet, the causes of current climate policy failures exist equally on the 
national and sub-national level, across sites of political struggle between incumbent and subordinate 
groups.31  
 
 
Mechanisms of institutional inertia 
 
We use the new institutionalist literature to examine explanations for inertia that stretch beyond the 
explicit division between the three strands discussed earlier (cf. Reference 24). The selected articles 
have two main common traits: a) they draw upon the central understandings of the new 
institutionalist approaches discussed above with reference to climate change; and b) shed light on the 
slow movement of institutions. Based on our review, we present five mechanisms of institutional 
inertia found in the new institutionalist literature on climate change. The selected mechanisms 
summarise the central explanations for institutional inertia in the climate change policy context and 
additionally display the breadth of new institutional theory. Costs, the first mechanism, demonstrate 
that while collective action is a prerequisite to urgent climate action, institutional constraints limit the 
incentive for actors to collaborate. Costs of collaboration are tightly coupled to an array of 
uncertainties, the second mechanism. These relate to the unpredictability of climate change and how 
we make sense of it as well as the challenges of calculating benefits accrued from future investments. 
Yet, possible courses of climate change mitigation are dependent on existing paths and relationships 
of power in the international political arena, representing the third and fourth mechanism 
respectively. These two mechanisms influence the range of possibilities to politically address climate 
change. The fifth mechanism looks at whether climate change mitigation represents a legitimate 
course of action or inaction and how different policy options are made acceptable. 
 
Costs 
 
A central mechanism of institutional inertia in the new institutionalist literature is the cost of 
implementing mitigative climate policy. In her study of the ‘Cities for Climate Protection’ in the United 
States (US), Betsill32 suggests that the capacity for local governments to take action against climate 
change is restricted by the high costs of co-ordinating the work between local departments as well as 
general budgetary constraints. On a general level, climate change is seen in the literature as a classic 
problem of public goods provision. Institutions maximise efficacy by lowering the costs for 
coordinating the service of a common goal, understood here as collective adherence of actors to 
maximise gain. Since climate change does not immediately conflict with common goal attainment, 
plausibly because adverse effects are delayed, there is little individual incentive to bear the costs of 
collective action in mitigation. The literature therefore views institutional inertia in terms of costs in 
bottom-up terms, as opposed to structural constraints (e.g. Reference 33 and Reference 34) – 
institutions are in other words often conceptualised as rules that influence the behaviour of actors. 
Distorted incentives through geographically and temporally displaced consequences as well as a 
decentralised enforcement of rules cause institutional inertia.35  
 
More specifically, costs can within the literature be divided into two main subgroups: costs of ‘free-
ridership’ and ‘transaction costs’. Free-ridership, where a large number of dispersed actors create a 
rational individual incentive for inaction, is considered the primary barrier to institutional efficacy in 
large-scale collective action problems. It is argued that in order to solve these collective action 
problems, climate change can only be addressed by an assurance that individual efforts will be 
matched by all in the group.34, 36 Additionally, the complexity of creating and adjusting frameworks for 
global mitigation is subject to so called endowment effects, where the structure of the prevailing 
institutional regime affects the preconceived basis for rational action. Transaction costs, on the other 
hand, are a direct result of inefficiencies in communication and negotiation required to change the 
status-quo of coordination action towards resolving a complex problem.34, 37 Institutions formed under 
the coordination of private interests persist, because they are economically efficient in serving their 
original purpose.37 However, the aggregate effects of efficiently coordinated private interests are not 
necessarily socially optimal. Transaction costs, in the form of barriers to coordination, are a significant 
hindrance to instigating change in an existing regime.  
 
 
Uncertainty  
 
The ‘large-n’ global-scale problem of public goods creates structural inertias beyond costs.31 
Institutions are tasked with addressing a real and increasing probability that adverse climate change 
effects will be both extreme and irreversible. Yet, some parts of the new institutionalist analysis views 
the fundamentally unpredictable catastrophic climate change no differently from rational calculations 
of risk.38 Given incomplete information, postponement of policy action on climate change remains a 
rational course of action due to the ‘regret potential’ of investing in possibly ‘unneeded’ mitigation 
technology.39 The uncertainty of shocks and tipping points makes systemic discontinuities 
fundamentally unpredictable, and therefore unmodelable, phenomena. Uncertainty is thus closely 
linked to the definition and framing of climate change, or how we make sense of the problem. The 
mechanism of structural uncertainty, under which the only certainty is that ex-ante structural change 
in the climate regime is unpredictable, is a potent force generating and reinforcing institutional 
inertia.40  
 
When uncertainty and unpredictability prevail, the process of defining and conceptualising climate 
change becomes of great importance. Vlassopoulous highlights that the definitional struggle of 
climate change within the Kyoto Protocol – mostly along the lines of seeing it either as an 
environmental or social problem – may hinder the creation of “new institutional equilibriums…and, 
consequently, policymaking cannot follow” (Reference 41, p. 104). The lack of clear definitions, or a 
common language, that help make sense of the problem at hand constitutes a significant obstacle to 
achieving institutional change. 
 
One way of addressing uncertainty of climate change is to employ the economic discount rate (see 
Reference 42 and Reference 43). The discount rate enables intertemporal comparisons of value by 
highlighting how actors appreciate future events vis-à-vis the present. The discount rate illustrates 
rational yet divergent and incompatible conclusions about the urgency of action. Reliance on 
discounting fails to present clear timely parameters for climate policy, instead creating a system that 
promotes systemic inertia regardless of the rate employed.44 Significant risk of catastrophic outcomes, 
which would render an aggressive strategy the most rational one, is evident but difficult to actualise 
under current institutional regimes.45, 46 Current institutional regimes rely on the discount rate concept 
to operationalise a path to action, but are unsuccessful because they cannot rationalise the real risk 
of catastrophic outcomes, thus increasing the perceived uncertainty around the necessity of taking 
urgent action.47 
 
 
 
Path dependence 
 
The role of path dependence in explaining institutional inertia is central to the historical institutionalist 
literature. Path dependence refers to the outcomes of “self-reinforcing or positive feedback 
processes” in a social system (Reference 12, p. 10). Mahoney48 sees path dependence as 
encompassing many other mechanisms also identified in this review, including power and legitimacy. 
Although it is indeed possible to conceive of path dependence as ‘meta-mechanism’, Mahoney also 
reasons that path dependence generates a historically embedded inertia with its own particular 
“nature” (Reference 48, p. 511). It can therefore be argued that inertia generated by path dependence 
is different from inertia stemming from other mechanisms.   
 
From the point of view of path dependence, inertia in climate change policy can be explained as the 
inability to change the paths of development due to the choices and decisions made in the past. This 
is for instance the case in a ‘technological lock-in’, where the relatively open futures of development 
are curtailed or closed down by the historical development and domination of carbon-based 
technology.49, 50 The logical result of such a lock-in is the absence of political or technical support for 
change. Thus, current-day struggles over technological fixes in climate change policy are historically 
situated51 and highlight that previously adopted technological innovations can create significant 
obstacles to institutional change.  
 
The literature also contends that path dependence is not limited to technological systems. Path 
dependence relates to both formal and informal institutions, i.e. rules and laws as well as practices 
and routines. Burch argues that assemblages of technologies, artefacts, bureaucracies and worldviews 
inform the course and velocity of development paths, which in the climate regime implies that “inertia 
[is] inherent in practices, habits and institutional arrangements” (Reference 8, p. 181). By studying 
how transport planning in Australian cities addresses climate change, Low et al. argue that path 
dependence comes in three varieties: “technical, institutional, and discursive” (Reference 52, p. 392). 
The authors pinpoint that previous investment in carbon-based infrastructure was in fact not the 
prime driver of resistance to institutional change, but that this resistance was constituted by multiple 
sources of path dependence, such as the enduring dominance of discursive story lines of economic 
interest vis-à-vis ecological concerns.  
 
In other words, path dependence can be identified in various contexts. With regard to climate change, 
institutional inertia “implies embeddedness – in social structures of relationships, power dynamics, 
meanings, and everyday practices that ‘hold’ institutional arrangements in place” (Reference 23, p. 
1373). This embeddedness shows how policy paths sustain incumbent practices. This can for instance 
be discerned in Pulver’s53 study of how major oil companies perceive climate change as a real-world 
threat to their interests. The variation can be explained by looking at how companies are “embedded 
in different scientific networks and policy fields” (Reference 53, p. 45), rather than by seeing it 
exclusively as a result of rational cost-benefit assessments. The close relationship between 
organisations and existing networks of knowledge and policy can thus demonstrate why some 
organisations are inert in responding to climate change.  
 
 
Power 
 
Power and the formation of group affinity within multilateral climate change policy are popular within 
the new institutionalist literature.31 One such factor is the unwavering support for the idea that nation-
states are sovereign political entities.29 Institutions have to reconcile the sovereignty claims of nation-
states with framings of responsibility-taking and burden-sharing that persist in multilateral climate 
change negotiations. In this sense, the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in the 
Kyoto Protocol could be construed as a trade-off among competing power coalitions.29 As a precursor 
to expectations of benefits resulting from (non-)compliance, domestic institutional structures are apt 
to redirect courses or strategies for action by tailoring policy responses to ‘the national interest’ (see 
also Reference 54).  
 
Concerning the political organisation of the nation-state, the system characteristics of the democratic 
polity become highly relevant. Liberal democracy has, by and large, been considered ill-equipped to 
address the urgency of climate change.19, 31, 55 This is mainly due to temporal and spatial determinants 
of political preferences15 (the ‘present’ and the ‘nation-state’, respectively), not to mention a general 
dislike for policy responses that need a long time to develop and pay off.31, 55 Both the 
intergenerational and intragenerational struggle between groups in society is thus aggravated by the 
vested interests that some of these groups have in inaction.19 According to Lijphart56, the vestedness 
of power can be explained by the organisational structure of democratic representation, particularly 
regarding multipartyism and multidimensional issue framing. Especially in Westminster democracies, 
the struggle between the traditional left and right over socio-economic issues contradicts the need to 
respond to more intangible policy issues, such as climate change. 
 
However, power is not confined to the formal institutions of how politics is organised, but is also 
identifiable in the ways in which climate change is debated and framed. Studies emphasise that the 
state is not a singular actor with consistent strategies, but is instead comprised of power blocs that 
influence the course, direction and velocity of climate policy.57-59 Actors within a corporatist state 
structure may negate the potential of subordinate groups to create substantive climate policy change 
by mainstreaming the normative dimension of emission reduction into strategic business 
management and the free market.35, 60 This is seen as problematic for overcoming inertia, mainly 
because it leaves the economic drivers of climate change uncovered.  
 
 
Legitimacy 
 
When problems are complex and clear guidelines for how to address them are absent legitimacy 
becomes important. A lack of legitimacy for policy action can explain much of why institutions are 
slow in addressing climate change.61 Institutions establish standards of acceptable and suitable 
courses of action, as well as which policies are sustained or abolished. For example, Harries and 
Penning-Rowsell62 highlight how local-level risk managers in England refused to adopt new climate 
change adaptation methods, as conventional methods are legitimised at the expense of newer ones. 
This refusal led to a decreased ability to address flood vulnerability, but instead strengthened the 
focus on customary flood defence.  
 
Conversely, institutional change can be resisted by delegitimising new ideas and cognitive scripts. For 
example, Vasi has shown that in the US the efforts to address climate change through various city-
level climate change programmes, such as Cities for Climate Protection, have been successfully 
delegitimised by the US government which sees them as “based on norms, values and expectations 
which are not appropriate and necessary features of local governments” as well as damaging to the 
national economic interest (Reference 63, p. 121). Depending on the interests of powerful actors, 
legitimacy can be used to both constrain and encourage institutional change.   
 
Definitions of what conduct should be considered legitimate or ‘appropriate’5, is enacted by actors 
with sufficient resources to do so. Institutions that are in active exchange with the broader social 
system, entangled in larger power webs, provide them with legitimacy.64 According to Matthews and 
Sydneysmith64, the relationship between legitimacy and power can be distinguished in international 
climate policy, where dominant actors are able to legitimise policy tools that correspond to economic 
interests rather than GHG emission mitigation. This can be illustrated by the development of flexible 
mechanisms within the Kyoto Protocol, including Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). It is argued that they reinforce the legitimacy of “economic growth” and “liberal 
trade” in climate policy by supplying signatories to the protocol with flexible choices for 
implementation (Reference 11, p. 210).  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Although the five mechanisms of institutional inertia appear in the text as distinct from each other, it 
is evident that they are interlinked to a large degree. For example, both legitimacy and power are 
coupled when studying who has the means to legitimise or delegitimise institutions. In other words, 
legitimisation processes are dependent on existing power relationships. Furthermore, power and 
legitimacy link up to path dependence, for the historical choice for a particular path is legitimised by 
powerful actors. Because of the uncertainties relating to the outcomes of climate change, actors apply 
various methods and framings to address the problem. The different methods and framings enjoy 
variable amounts of legitimacy, which in turn is linked to the costs of policy implementation.  
 
Nevertheless, it is useful to analytically separate the five mechanisms, as they also by themselves 
constitute the very means that generate institutional inertia. It is also important to stress that the 
mechanisms are linked to specific types of institutions and strands of new institutionalism – e.g. 
legitimacy is closely related to SI and path dependence to HI. This highlights that depending on which 
theoretical approach one adopts, the causes of institutional inertia often tend to be conceptualised in 
a specific way. Table 1 has summed up the mechanisms and their implications for actor behaviour and 
climate change policy. We concur with Hall and Taylor24 that behaviour is an intrinsic component of 
policy, subsequent to institutional change or inertia. Reflecting a mirror image, Table 1 also 
demonstrates how inertia might be overcome by addressing the main institutional constraints in each 
mechanism. 
 
 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
 
As the mechanisms draw upon the theoretically diverse new institutionalist literature, the means to 
address inertia will similarly be dependent on the theoretical approach one adopts. Although the RCI 
literature tend to prioritise agency and individual behaviour over institutional influence, and thus 
envisage institutions as mere vehicles for collective action, within the HI and SI camps the tendency is 
the opposite.24 However, attempts to bring these approaches closer to each other have lately gained 
interest amongst institutionalist scholars. A popular example of this is the research on ‘institutional 
entrepreneurship’ and ‘institutional work’.65-68 In short, where the former focuses on agency that leads 
to institutional creation or change, the latter is concerned with a wider range of forms of agency, 
including the ‘maintenance’ of institutions as well as cases where entrepreneurship fails. Institutional 
work and entrepreneurship emphasise that although actors are institutionally situated, they are 
nevertheless capable of acting strategically in creating and changing institutional settings.69, 70 This 
research can therefore be seen as an attempted synthesis of the three strands of new institutionalism, 
where the preferences and behaviour of actors are neither fully socially defined nor independent of 
the social context. 
 
The focus on agency can also be identified in the new institutionalist literature on climate change. For 
example, Wijen and Ansari69 utilise the concept of ‘collective institutional entrepreneurship’ to study 
the creation of the Kyoto Protocol and highlight several drivers that can break institutional inertias. 
These drivers include amongst others: power brokerage; devising favourable cognitive frames for 
change; and crafting incentives for lowering transaction costs. By combining the work on institutional 
entrepreneurship and windows of opportunity, Buhr71 has studied the inclusion of aviation in the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The change in the EU ETS was possible because 
institutional entrepreneurship was coupled to three main temporally specific factors: at the time of 
its inception the EU ETS was politically legitimate; climate change was acknowledged as an important 
policy issue; and the political support for including aviation was strong.  
 
The study of agency in climate change policy can also be found in the transnational relations literature. 
This field of research focuses on the role of transnational advocacy networks72 in influencing 
international climate agreements and more broadly transnational climate governance.73 Schroeder 
shows that the means of indigenous peoples to influence international climate negotiations through 
nation-states have proven difficult, as they are dominated by “[t]he interest of the powerful elite” 
(Reference 74, p. 329). Yet, they have been able to gain influence through various transnational 
advocacy coalitions including environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) operating at 
the international policy level. Agency ‘beyond the state’ can thus enable diverse avenues for 
overcoming structural barriers of change.  
 
Interestingly, path dependence has also been prescribed as a potential means to address institutional 
inertia. For example, proactive policy-makers may nurture “countervailing policies that might trigger 
path-dependent ‘low carbon’ trajectories” (Reference 15, p. 124), which drives future policy choices 
to mitigate GHG emissions. Urpelainen75 has shown that future climate change policy choices will 
follow the logic of decisions made in the past. When ‘green’ governments opt to implement mitigation 
policies and are in addition willing to invest initial capital, it may become too expensive to dismantle 
such policies at a later stage. As a consequence, successor ‘brown’ governments are compelled to 
sustain the policies because of an improved cost-benefit ratio. However, the success of ‘using’ 
institutional inertia for cementing climate-friendly policies ultimately depends on the capacity of 
actors to initiate these institutional changes. This is why a focus on agency in institutional 
arrangements is crucial, especially when studying the need for new paths within climate change policy.  
 
Focusing on the specific practices and processes that may, or may not, initiate institutional change 
enables for a more comprehensive view of the relationship between institutions, on the one hand, 
and individual and organisational behaviour, on the other. Here, the mechanisms of institutional 
inertia presented in this review article become valuable, as they highlight areas where the study of 
agency, either in the form of institutional entrepreneurship or beyond, can potentially address the 
urgency of climate change.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Climate scientists have repeatedly called for urgent mitigating action in order to avoid the most 
adverse effects of climate change. However, within the political arena these actions are largely lacking. 
Therefore, identifying the structural barriers to change as well as devising possible solutions to 
overcome these is of great importance. In this review article we have studied the ways in which 
institutional inertia is depicted in the new institutionalist literature on climate change. Institutional 
inertia refers to the ‘stickiness’ of institutions, or the tendency of institutions to move slowly and resist 
change. New institutionalism is a popular field of research that places emphasis on the irreducibility 
of social problems to the individual, thereby highlighting the role of the more structural traits of 
problem-solving.  
 
Based on our review, the new institutionalist literature is a useful tool for providing explanations for 
the slow movement of institutions in climate change policy. In our review we identified five main 
mechanisms of inertia: (1) cost; (2) uncertainty; (3) path dependence; (4) power; and (5) legitimacy. 
Although the five mechanisms are presented separately, it is important to stress that they are closely 
interlinked and are indeed feeding back into each other, thereby rendering attempts to address these 
more complex. Overcoming the institutional inertias requires efforts on different levels and in various 
social fields. The contribution of this review article is that it scrutinises the concept of institutional 
inertia and its relevance for climate change policy, which can assist researchers making sense of the 
different explanations for policy inaction.  
 
Bearing in mind the time lags existing in climatic and institutional systems, addressing inertias is of 
central importance for climate policy in order to address the urgency of climate change and to mitigate 
the most severe effects of climate change in a timely manner. The new institutionalist literature shows 
that the development of climate policy innovations is a comprehensive endeavour that encompasses 
the realms of resources, knowledge, norms, technological development and cognition. Putting 
institutions into the limelight thus enables for a more inclusive understanding of climate change policy 
dynamics. We urge future research to take seriously the role of agency within institutionalist 
arrangements. This can help us to pinpoint how instances of institutional inertia are both challenged 
and reproduced by actors in different institutional settings. 
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Tables 
Table 1. The mechanisms of institutional inertia and implications for the climate regime.  
 
Mechanism 
of 
institutional 
inertia 
Types of 
institution 
experiencing 
inertia 
Implications for 
behaviour 
Implications for 
climate change 
policy 
How might inertia be 
overcome? 
Costs Rules and laws 
that guide the 
coordination of 
actors 
The costs of 
mitigating action 
withdraw actors 
engagement in 
climate change 
Risk of free-riding 
and transaction 
costs prevent 
collectively optimal 
decisions in 
climate change 
policy  
Creating incentive 
systems that lower 
transaction costs for 
institutional change 
Uncertainty Definitions of 
climate change 
and its 
influence on 
society 
Uncertainty 
inhibits actors to 
fully grasp the 
impacts of climate 
change 
The challenge of 
defining climate 
change as a 
problem and 
estimating its 
impacts delays 
policy action 
Devising favourable 
frames for change 
aiming at reaching 
consensus among 
political actors on 
climate change 
Path 
dependence 
Organisational 
structure of the 
polity as well as 
rules and 
routines guiding 
technological 
development 
Actors have 
limited 
possibilities to 
devise strategic 
alternatives to the 
existing path of 
development 
Lock-in of 
technological 
systems and 
routines tied to the 
status-quo hinders 
the switch to new 
paths 
Mobilising actor(s) 
with sufficient power 
to create new paths 
for institutional 
innovation; Using 
path dependence to 
institutionalise low-
carbon trajectories 
Power Organisational 
structure of the 
polity as well as 
framing of 
climate change 
Existing 
institutional 
structures 
facilitate 
incumbent actors; 
Insubordinate 
groups are 
hindered to exert 
pressure 
Powerful actors 
resist calls for 
quick fixes in 
climate policy 
because they 
challenge actors’ 
self-interest 
Power brokerage 
between powerful 
actors; Forming 
coalition of regime-
changing actors in 
the international 
political arena 
Legitimacy Rules, norms, 
routines, 
cognitive scripts 
and standards 
for behaviour 
Current practices 
are sustained, as 
they are 
considered 
appropriate by 
actors 
New policies that 
do not enjoy 
acceptance are 
delegitimised and 
objected against 
Increasing legitimacy 
of innovative policies 
and institutional 
pathways by doing 
boundary-work and 
political bargaining 
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